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The courts have never satisfactorily resolved whether a plaintiff in a
tort action who disapproves of medical care on religious grounds may
be required to obtain such care in mitigation of damages. This issue
has arisen in numerous cases over the years, and reference to it has
been a standard feature in torts textbooks.' This Note attempts to
resolve this issue by examining the two positions adopted by courts in
the past and by indicating how a third alternative is required by recent
First Amendment case law.
The mitigation of damages doctrine imposes a duty on a potential
tort plaintiff to make a reasonable attempt after an accident to reduce
his injuries. It denies compensation for additional damages attributable
to a failure to fulfill that duty.2 A constitutional issue arises when a
plaintiff has religious beliefs about the proper ways to cure injuries.
Christian Scientists and many Pentecostal groups teach that all
physical maladies may be cured spiritually. Jehovah's Witnesses gen-
erally accept medical care, but believe it is a grave sin to accept blood
transfusions even in a life-and-death situation.4 Unless the mitigation
1. E.g., P. KEETON & R. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 192 (1971);
H. SHULMAN, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 474-76 (3d
ed. 1976).
2. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.10, at 1231-32 (1956); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 422-24 (4th ed. 1971). In essence, the doctrine,
also known as the "avoidable consequences" rule, id., creates a form of plaintiff's negli-
gence, id. This is not, however, a comparative negligence rule. The plaintiff is barred
from recovery for all damages caused in part by his unreasonable actions. 2 F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, supra § 22.10, at 1232. Nor is it, of course, a contributory negligence rule,
because the defendant remains liable for injuries that could not have been mitigated. W.
PROSSER, supra § 65, at 423.
3. See M. EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEALTH 142-64 (1937) (through Christian Science, "divine
Mind" cures all ailments); YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN AND CANADIAN CHURCHES 42, 45-46, 78
(C. Jacquet ed. 1977) (Pentecostal faith-healing groups include Church of God, Church
of God of Prophecy, and Pentecostal Free Will Baptist Church). Christian Science does
not absolutely prohibit medical care. Members are taught that all diseases can and should
be cured by faith healing, and those who seek medical care are said to have had lapses of
faith, rather than to have committed sins. D. JOHN, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE WAY OF LIFE
127-29 (1962). But it is also taught that the two healing methods are fundamentally in-
compatible and cannot be combined. Id. Thus a law requiring medical care would sub-
stantially interfere with the practice of the Christian Science faith. Id. at 19. See CoM-
MITTEE ON PUBLICATION, LEGAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF CHRISTIAN SCIENTISTS IN
CONNECTICUT 14 (1975) (law compelling Christian Scientist to submit to medical treatment
amounts to limiting his worship of God by governmental decree).
4. The Jehovah's Witnesses no longer adhere to their earlier belief in faith healing,
H. STROUP, THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES 107 (1945), but they now refuse blood transfusions
regularly, because they believe them to be specifically prohibited by the Bible. A.
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rule is applied in a way that accommodates the beliefs of these groups,
reductions in tort recoveries for failure to mitigate may constitute an
undue interference with religious freedom.
The two responses to this issue in past cases may, for convenience, be
labeled the "objective" and "case-by-case" approaches. The objective
rule is exemplified by a series of workmen's compensation cases that
have held that religion may not justify an otherwise unreasonable fail-
ure to obtain medical treatment.5 These decisions have justified denial
or reduction of compensation awards by adhering to the general tort
principle that, in judging conduct by the standard of the "reasonable
man," the subjective beliefs of the actor should not be considered. 6
The case-by-case approach represents an attempted accommodation
ROGERSON, MILLIONS Now LIVING WILL NEVER DIE 186-87 (1969). Jehovah's Witnesses some-
times claim that transfusions are not medically beneficial, id. at 187; their main con-
cern, however, is spiritual since they believe that "prolonging their life by accepting a
blood transfusion is a direct sin against God and jeopardizes their prospects of eternal
life." Id.
5. E.g., Martin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 147 Cal. App. 2d 137, 138-39, 143, 304
P.2d 828, 829, 831 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (death benefits denied to family of Jehovah's
Witness who refused transfusions during spleen operation); Marlar v. Rosenberg Bros., 20
Cal. Indus. Accident Comm'n 35, 35 (1934) (Christian Scientist refused surgery on
fractured wrist); Industrial Comm'n v. Vigil, 150 Colo. 356, 361, 373 P.2d 308, 311 (1962)
(refusal to undergo surgery); Walter Nashert & Sons v. McCann, 460 P.2d 941, 943 (Okla.
1969) (failure to take heart medications). But cf. Swan v. Walnut Grove Creamery Co., 10
Cal. Indus. Accident Comm'n 126, 126 (1923) (employee who used exclusively Christian
Science methods to treat burn given full recovery because of lack of evidence that such
methods delayed return to work).
At least with respect to deliberate decisions by an injured person to forgo medical care,
the statutory workmen's compensation rules resemble common law tort principles. Lud-
lam, Plaintiff's Duty to Minimize Defendant's Liability by Surgery, 17 TENN. L. REV. 821,
821-24 (1943) (two rules are similar, although tort places slightly greater burden on in-
jured plaintiff). Reasonableness remains the determining factor. I A. LARSON, THE LAW
OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 13.22, at 3-398 (7th ed. 1978); IV. MALONE & M. PLANT,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON WORKIEN'S COMPENSATION 363-65 (1963) (citing cases and statutes).
Except as indicated, it will be assumed in this Note that the duties imposed on injured
persons by tort and workmen's compensation law present comparable constitutional
problems.
Some states have provided statutory exemptions for Christian Scientists by permitting
them to recover compensation if they avoid medical treatment. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.42(1), (5), (7) (West 1973 & Supp. 1977-78) (employee may choose Christian Science
treatment unless employer has filed notice of decision not to pay for such treatment);
see John, Recognition of Christian Science Treatment, INS. L.J., Jan. 1963, at 19.
6. E.g., Walter Nashert & Sons v. McCann, 460 P.2d 941, 943 (Okla. 1969) (compensa-
tion cannot be increased if reasonable care is refused on religious grounds); Ash v. Barker,
2 Cal. Indus. Accident Comm'n 40, 45 (1915) (if symptoms indicate need for surgery, re-
fusal based on Christian Science beliefs cannot be held "reasonable" as statute uses term).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 283, Comment c, at 12 (1965) (standard of conduct
"must be an objective and external one, rather than that of the individual judgment,
good or bad, of the particular individual").
Presumably, in cases involving serious injuries, an objective standard of reasonableness
would generally lead courts to require plaintiffs to obtain medical care. But see John,
supra note 5, at 20 (argument that results of Christian Science treatment warrant ac-
ceptance of it as reasonable alternative to medical care).
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of this general principle with the rights of religious plaintiffs under
the free exercise clause.7 In the leading case of Lange v. Hoyt,8 for
example, the court applied the reasonable man standard, but instructed
the jury to treat the plaintiff's Christian Science beliefs as a relevant
factor in its assessment of her mitigation efforts.9
Neither of these approaches adequately accommodates First Amend-
ment principles. Although the objective approach serves valid secular
purposes' ° and applies only incidentally to religious beliefs, it burdens
religious practices in a manner proscribed by the free exercise clause.
The case-by-case approach may alleviate this burden in some instances,
but it violates the establishment clause 1 because it requires each court
to assess the reasonableness of religiously motivated conduct. A partial
exemption from the mitigation rule, therefore, is necessary for plain-
tiffs with religious beliefs about medical care; they should be required
to mitigate damages only by methods that do not violate those beliefs.
I. The Objective Rule and Free Exercise
Two Supreme Court cases provide the framework for analyzing the
free exercise issues presented by the objective mitigation rule. Sherbert
v. Verner12 and Wisconsin v. Yoder 3 each created exemptions for
citizens whose free exercise was burdened by a neutral state law. In
Sherbert a Seventh Day Adventist was denied state unemployment
benefits when she refused, because of her beliefs about the Sabbath, to
accept a job requiring work on Saturdays.'4 Although the South
Carolina courts upheld this denial of benefits, 15 the Supreme Court
reversed, calling it an impermissible burden on free exercise. 16 In
Yoder Amish parents were exempted from state laws requiring them to
send their children to public high schools.'
7
7. U.S. CONsr. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise
of religion").
8. 114 Conn. 590, 159 A. 575 (1932).
9. Id. at 596-97, 159 A. at 577-78; accord, Christiansen v. Hollings, 44 Cal. App. 2d
332, 346, 112 P.2d 723, 730 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941) ("[I]f the injured party is a believer in
Christian Science, the jury should be instructed . . . that such belief is a factor to be
considered . . . in determining whether the injured person used reasonable diligence.")
10. See pp. 1478-79 infra.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion").
12. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
13. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
14. 374 U.S. at 399-401.
15. Sherbert v. Verner, 240 S.C. 286, 125 S.E.2d 737 (1962), rev'd, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
16. 374 U.S. at 402. The Court held that "to condition the availability of benefits upon
this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectiIelv
penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties." Id. at 406.
17. 406 U.S. at 207.
1468
Vol. 87: 1466, 1978
Religion and Mitigation of Damages
These cases suggest a two-step analysis of the legitimacy, under the
free exercise clause, of the objective mitigation rule.' First, it must
be determined whether application of the rule against religious tort
plaintiffs can be said to burden free exercise. 19 If such a burden exists,
the rule can only be retained if the state can demonstrate a compelling
interest in its enforcement. 20 Despite its apparent simplicity, this test
is difficult to apply because the concepts "burden" and "compelling
state interest" are poorly defined by the existing case law.21
A. The Burden
In Sherbert and cases in analogous areas, it was established that if a
state benefit is conditioned on the abandonment of one's rights, the
result may be an unconstitutional burden on personal freedoms. 22 A
state benefit burdens free exercise if it is conditioned on conduct
prohibited by religious beliefs and if its effect is comparable to that of
a law requiring the conduct directly.23
When a plaintiff's religious beliefs forbid medical care, the objective
mitigation rule imposes a condition on the receipt of a state benefit
that exerts pressure on him to relinquish his religious convictions. The
18. The main arguments in Sherbert and Yoder were premised on assumptions that
the beliefs involved were both sincere and religious. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
209, 216 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 n.1 (1963). This initial issue-
whether the plaintiff's beliefs are sincere and religious-would be unlikely to present
difficulties in cases involving a free exercise claim by a religious plaintiff who has been
penalized for a failure to mitigate. Most such plaintiffs will be able to demonstrate the
religious nature of their beliefs by relating them to theological doctrines of recognized
religious groups. They will also be able to demonstrate their sincerity by linking their post-
accident actions with past patterns of behavior indicating adherence to these religious
precepts.
19. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218-19 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403 (1963).
20. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (only "interests of the highest order"
can justify burdens on free exercise); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
21. Cf. Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion: A Sociological Approach, 67 MIcH. L.
Rv. 679, 687 (1969) (free exercise case law needs to define further relevant individual
and state interests).
22. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-06 (1963). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 627, 634 (1969) (one-year waiting period for welfare imposed on new state
residents conditions benefits on abandonment of right to change residence); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (tax exemptions conditioned on loyalty oath restrain
free speech); T. EMERSON, TnE SYsrE.M OF FREEDOM OF EXPRSSio\, 191-96 (1970) (citing
cases). But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 324 (1971) (welfare benefits may be condi-
tioned on allowing state employees to enter home).
23. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (law burdens free exercise "as
would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship"); Note, Freedom of
Religion atid Science Instruction in Public Schools, 87 YALE L.J. 515, 528-30 (1978) (bene-
fit is unconstitutional if conditioned on conduct that state could not require directly be-
cause forbidden by religious beliefs and if benefit is effectively equivalent to requiring
that conduct).
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state benefit, full compensation for injuries suffered,24 is conditioned
on compliance with the duty to mitigate. Mitigation of damages is
defined by the objective rule to include acceptance of medical treat-
ment despite religious beliefs to the contrary. Under this rule, a plain-
tiff who abandons his beliefs and accepts medical care does not neces-
sarily increase the compensation he receives for his injury,2 but he may
eliminate the disparity between that sum and his existing injuries.20
1. Assessing the Burden
The conditions imposed by the tort recovery process will not burden
free exercise unless they create substantial pressure on potential plain-
tiffs to violate their beliefs.2 7 Sherbert provides few guidelines for
identifying those situations in which a burden exists, 28 but examina-
tion of a number of other conditional benefit cases suggests three
relevant criteria.29 First, the benefit must be important. Second, the
benefit must not merely equalize the treatment of religious and non-
religious citizens. Third, the benefit must be likely, as an empirical
24. See Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1970) (purpose
of damages is to put plaintiff in his original position by compensating for all injuries
actually suffered); Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081, 1096 (N.D. Ohio
1975) (in any action involving damages, objective is to compensate victim and make him
whole); W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 2, at 7 (purpose of tort action is to compensate victim
for damage he has suffered).
25. If it is assumed that courts are able to determine accurately the aggravation of
existing injuries that has resulted from a refusal of medical care in a given case, then the
dollar amount of a plaintiff's compensation for injuries suffered will be the same whether
or not he chooses to obtain such care. The plaintiff who obtains medical care would,
however, receive additional damages as reimbursement for the medical expenses incurred.
26. The pressure that the tort system may exert on those with beliefs about medical
treatment must be considered the product of "state action." The pressure results from a
right of recovery created by the state to serve its goals, such as compensation, justice, and
deterrence. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, § 11.5, at 743 (listing objectives of
tort law); cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (state action is
present in libel case, even though "law has been applied in a civil action and . . . it is
common law only, though supplemented by statute"). In addition, the benefit of full
compensation is actually denied only by official court action. Cf. Hosey v. Club Van Cort-
landt, 299 F. Supp. 501, 505-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding that Constitution forbids state
enforcement of eviction by private landlord in retaliation for exercise of First Amendment
rights on theory that court action cannot support private burdens on such rights).
27. See Note, supra note 23, at 530.
28. The Sherbert decision deals with the burden question in rather conclusory fashion.
The Court stated that the plaintiff could choose either to follow her Sabbatarian beliefs
and forfeit unemployment compensation, or to accept work and abandon her faith. Then
it simply concluded that the imposition of this choice puts the same burden on free
exercise "as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship." 374 U.S.
at 404.
29. E.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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matter, to motivate a potential beneficiary to take the actions allegedly
being encouraged.
Precedent indicates that a state benefit will be important to a person
if it provides a portion of his basic livelihood ° or creates a substantial
opportunity for greater wealth and statusY1 Sherbert, for example, in-
volved the benefit of unemployment compensation.3 2 Cases involving
constitutional rights other than free exercise have recognized the pres-
sures created by conditional grants of welfare,33 public housing,3 4
public office,35 admission to the bar,36 and driver's licenses.37
As Johnson v. Robison38 demonstrates, however, even an important
conditional benefit will not create a constitutionally significant burden
if it merely equalizes the position of religious and nonreligious people.
In that case, a conscientious objector sought to receive veterans' educa-
tion benefits by arguing that these benefits were unconstitutionally
conditioned on service in the military, an activity prohibited by his
religion.39 The Supreme Court, denying his claim, called the burden
"incidental" at best 40 and noted that the benefits were intended by
Congress as compensation for the "peculiar rigors of military service." 41
The Robison Court did not attempt to minimize the value in our
society of educational opportunity. Instead, its holding reflects an
attempt to assess the relative benefits and burdens of military and
30. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (welfare benefits conditioned
on one-year residency).
31. E.g., Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1971) (grant of admission to bar condi-
tioned on answering questions regarding membership in Communist organizations).
32. 374 U.S. at 399-401.
33. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627, 634 (1969) (one-year waiting period for
new residents burdens right to change residence).
34. Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 386 U.S. 670, 678-79 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) (oc-
cupancy of public housing cannot be conditioned on sacrifice of rights of association).
35. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961) (state cannot coerce declarations of
religious faith by oaths required of public officeholders).
36. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514-16 (1967) (privilege against self-incrimination
should not be "watered down" by allowing disbarment as penalty).
37. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (because driver's licenses "may become
essential in the pursuit of a livelihood," state cannot require drivers to give up procedural
due process rights in order to obtain such licenses).
38. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
39. Id. at 383.
40. Id. at 385.
41. Id. at 385 n.19. It should be noted that in addition to concluding that the law
imposed little or no burden on Robison's free exercise, the Court in Robison argued
that even a significant burden could be justified in this setting by the government's in-
terest in protecting the nation. Id. at 383-85. It relied on Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437 (1971), a case that upheld the much greater burden imposed by the draft system
on conscientious objectors to particular wars who must choose to accept induction, to go
to jail, or to become fugitives. Thus a detailed analysis of the extent of the burden in-
posed in Robison was not essential to the outcome and was not undertaken by the Court.
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alternative service.42 Read in this light, the Court's opinion suggests
that where the state has created a religious exemption from perfor-
mance of civic duties by requiring service in alternative, religiously ac-
ceptable ways, it need only ensure that the overall "package" of duties
and benefits entailed by the religiously acceptable option be no more
onerous that the duties and benefits of the other choice. 43 When Con-
gress allowed conscientious objectors the option of performing alterna-
tive national service, it could constitutionally equalize the overall
choice presented by giving some additional benefits to those who, by
military service, risked life and suffered isolation from civilian life.
44
A final consideration in assessing the constitutionality of a condi-
tional benefit, not yet fully recognized by the courts, is the degree to
which the conditions imposed are likely to create pressure on an in-
dividual to alter his conduct in order to qualify. If, in practice, no
such pressure exists, then no burden results.A3 This factual assessment
requires weighing the various considerations that would contribute to
an individual's decision to seek the benefit. For example, Robison
might be interpreted as a case where the Court simply concluded that
veterans' education benefits are seldom an important factor in the
decisions of potential draftees about whether or not to seek conscien-
tious objector status.
46
2. The Burden of the Objective Rule
These three criteria, when applied to the plight of a tort plaintiff
objecting to medical care for religious reasons, lead to the conclusion
that the objective rule does impose a significant burden on free exercise.
The benefit involved, full compensation for personal injury, is certainly
important. By compensating for lost earnings, pain and suffering, and
42. See Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 348-54
(1969) (alternative burdens may be imposed on conscientious objectors), cited at Johnson
v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 385 n.19 (1974).
43. The Court in Robison did not attempt to make an exact comparison of the duties
and benefits of draftees and conscientious objectors. Such comparisons appear to be
beyond judicial competence. See United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 113 (Ist Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970) (in case challenging civilian work requirement for
conscientious objectors, court will defer to legislative judgment concerning exact balance
struck between conscience and needs of state).
44. See Clark, supra note 42, at 348-54.
45. See, e.g., Walsh v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 428 F. Supp. 1261, 1268-69
(E.D. La. 1977) (restrictions on athletic participation of transfers to religious high schools
held to have only minimal or insignificant impact on free exercise).
46. See 415 U.S. at 385 ("The challenged legislation ... does not require appellee and
his class to make any choice comparable to that required of the petitioners in Gillette.")
See note 41 supra.
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medical expenses, 47 tort damages affected by the mitigation rule can
constitute a large part of a plaintiff's livelihood.
48
The objective rule cannot be explained as an effort to equalize the
positions of plaintiffs with and without religious scruples about medi-
cal care. Since the government has not previously provided any exemp-
tion for the religious in tort law, the burden imposed by the objective
rule in fact places plaintiffs with religious scruples at an overall dis-
advantage. Both classes of plaintiffs have injuries and expenses for
which they seek compensation; the rule denies full compensation to
those whose mitigation efforts are affected by religious beliefs.
I Whether there exists an empirical likelihood that the objective rule
places pressure on a plaintiff's decisions concerning adherence to
religious practices is more problematic. It may be that potential plain-
tiffs do not perceive the connection between tort recovery and their
religious persuasions when they decide on treatment, or it may be that
factors other than liability rules control their choices. General jury
verdicts, by cloaking the calculus of damages, may leave in doubt the
extent to which the rule is actually applied to penalize religiously
motivated conduct.49 Even a well-established past pattern of penalties
may not influence potential plaintiffs when they are choosing to forgo
or accept medical care; a possible lawsuit may be too remote a factor.
These conjectures concerning the possible de minimis impact of
the objective rule do not, however, withstand close scrutiny. One may
question at the outset whether a state-imposed religious burden may
be upheld merely because it is "hidden" from the unwary citizen; such
a burden might implicate the establishment clause. 50 Furthermore,
47. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, at §§ 25.8, 25.9, 25.10.
The workmen's compensation system is somewhat different because it gives compensa-
tion only for injuries that produce disability and therefore affect earning power. A.
LARSON, supra note 5, § 2A0. Moreover, unlike tort law, the system does not attempt to
restore to a claimant all that he has lost through an injury. Id. § 2.50. Nevertheless,
because compensation awards are intended to protect injured workers from destitution,
id., they are probably just as important to recipients as most tort recoveries.
48. The conclusion that tort damages denied to religious plaintiffs may be essential
to livelihood is not undermined by the ability of some plaintiffs, such as Christian
Scientists, to obtain health insurance contracts providing for payment of the costs of
treatment in accordance with their religious beliefs. See John, supra note 5, at 20-22.
These policies are limited to specific religious groups, and they cover only one component
of the costs included in tort recoveries-medical expenses. Id. (policies provide payments
for Christian Science practitioners, nurses, and sanitoriums).
49. General jury verdicts produce a single, unexplained damage figure, based on a
number of complex, sometimes intuitive, calculations. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JANMEs, supra
note 2, § 25.1, at 1301 (compensation in personal injury case will always be "figurative
and essentially speculative").
50. Where the state consistently penalizes religious conduct, there may be a constitu-
tional violation regardless of whether the burden is perceived soon enough in each case
to affect religious freedom. Such penalties may be barred by the establishment clause. See
pp. 1482-83 infra.
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the effect of the mitigation rule on the recovery will often be apparent.
Not all decisions about mitigation are made by juries,3' and even many
jury verdicts will leave no doubt concerning the extent to which the
objective rule has been applied -.5 2 The threat to religious plaintiffs
consequently is significant.
That threat is likely to produce an awareness by religious plaintiffs
of the ramifications of their treatment choices. Members of groups such
as the Christian Scientists and the Jehovah's Witnesses are likely to be
aware of the legal problems experienced in the past by their fellow
members.5 3 In addition, except in unusual cases involving emergency
first aid, decisions about treatment may often be preceded by consulta-
tions with professionals such as doctors, lawyers, workmen's compensa-
tion officials, or even clergymen,54 who are presumably knowledgeable
about the legal duties of a plaintiff. The burden on free exercise is thus
not only substantial, but also apparent to plaintiffs faced with the
choice between full compensation and fidelity to religious beliefs.
The conclusion that the objective rule places significant burdens on
free exercise is supported by Montgomery v. Board of Retirement,5
a recent California case involving the denial of a disability pension to
a public employee who refused, because of her faith-healing beliefs, to
51. Workmen's compensation disputes are, for example, heard initially by commissions,
I A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 1.10, at 2, then appealed to the courts.
52. When the mitigation rules reduce a recovery dramatically, the effect will be
apparent. E.g., City of Duncan v. Nicholson, 118 Okla. 275, 277, 247 P. 979, 980-81 (1926)
(in case without religious issue small damage award was presumed to result from jury's
consideration of plaintiff's failure to mitigate). In addition, some juries may be asked to
produce special verdicts, explaining their findings on specific issues in the case, including
mitigation. E.g., Merrick v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry., 141 Kan. 591, 596-97, 42 P.2d 950,
953 (1935) (in nonreligious case, most of damages awarded by jury must be denied be-
cause jury also made special finding of failure to mitigate).
53. These groups are relatively small and tightly knit. The Jehovah's Witnesses have
a long history of legal problems that are presumably known to the present members.
See, e.g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (exclusion from use of public park
for services); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (restriction on sale of religious
literature by children); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(compulsory flag salute). See generally ANIERICAN CIvIL LIBERTIES UNION, TIM PERSECUTION
OF JEHOVAH'S WITNEssrs (1941).
Christian Scientists have also had numerous, less well-known confrontations with legal
authorities. See generally Schneider, Christian Science and the Law: Room for Cont-
promise?, I COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 81 (1965); Steinhardt, Christian Science: Religious
Freedom and State Control, 7 MIAMn L.Q. 358 (1953). They are told that they should be
the most "law-abiding people on earth" and that it is therefore "essential" for them to
"know their legal obligations." Co T.IrEC ON PUBLICATION, supra note 3, at 7.
54. In most cases involving mitigation by a religious plaintiff, the factual settings in-
dicate ample opportunity for such consultation. See, e.g., Industrial Comm'n v. Vigil, 150
Colo. 356, 358, 373 P.2d 308, 309 (1962) (refusal of surgery); Walter Nashert & Sons v.
McCann, 460 P.2d 941, 942 (Okla. 1969) (refusal to take medication over long period).
55. 33 Cal. App. 3d 447, 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Ct. App. 1973).
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undergo surgery that would have restored her ability to work.50 The
court, relying expressly on Sherbert, held the denial a burden on free
exercise.57 The choice faced by the employee in Montgomery was
analogous to that faced by a potential tort plaintiff with similar be-
liefs.58 In the former case, the employee could return to her work by
violating her beliefs or remain disabled without compensation; in the
latter, the plaintiff can accept medical care and be fully compensated
or follow his beliefs and endure uncompensated injuries. In either
situation, free exercise is restrained.
B. The State Interests
1. The Compelling Interest Requirement
Although Sherbert held that the burden created by a conditional
benefit may be justified by a compelling state interest,5 9 the case
provides few criteria for determining when such a state interest is
present.60 Courts faced with new cases may choose either to uphold
almost any free exercise claim,," or to engage in a formless balancing
of individual and governmental interests, applying the "compelling"
label whenever they decide the state should win. 62 The inherent
elasticity of the compelling interest standard has been recognized by
the Supreme Court. In Yoder, for example, the Court manifested con-
56. Id. at 448-50, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 182-83. Under the terms of the statute governing
disability pensions, the denial of benefits depended, not on a finding that the refusal of
the surgery was unreasonable, but on a finding that the applicant was not "permanently
incapacitated" because surgery could restore her health. Id. at 449, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 183
(discussing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 31720 (West 1968)). This difference in the legal standard
for denying the benefit does not, however, affect the significance of the burden created
when the benefit is in fact denied.
57. Id. at 451, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
58. Id. at 453, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (declining to follow Martin v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 147 Cal. App. 2d 137, 304 P.2d 828 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956), which upheld denial of
workmen's compensation benefits to employees who refuse medical care on religious
grounds, because the "ratio decidendi of the case is inconsistent with and cannot be
reconciled with the rules laid down in . .. [Sherbert]").
59. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
60. See note 21 supra.
61. Cf. L. PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR AND THE CoNs'rnuTrIoN 36 (1975) (compelling interest
test affords nearly absolute protection to religious exercise).
62. See Clark, supra note 42, at 330 (courts need more specific guidelines for dealing
with free exercise cases); 18 VILL. L. REV. 955, 967 (1973) (weighing of state interests in
Yoder fails to enlighten future courts about how decisions should be made). "Ad hoc
balancing" of interests can be criticized on two grounds. First, it increases the danger
that courts will defer too often to legislative judgments and fail to protect First Amend-
ment rights adequately. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRsT AMEND-
MENT 55 (1967); Clark, supra note 42, at 330. Second, it represents adjudication under-
taken in the absence of neutral standards. Marcus, The Forumn of Conscience: Applying
Standards under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1240.
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cern over the need for a more specific definition of compelling in-
terest by attempting to find less conclusory synonyms, although its
best effort-"interests of the highest order"63-indicates that the at-
tempt to achieve clarity fell short of success.
In the free speech area, the Court's efforts to clarify compelling in-
terest analysis have been more fruitful. In United States v. O'Brien,64
a case involving a conviction for draft card burning, the Court noted
the various ways in which earlier cases had described the state interest
required to justify incidental interference with expression: "com-
pelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong."'' 5 The
Court continued:
Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an impor-
tant or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental in-
terest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.(0
The Court's language indicates that the O'Brien test might reasonably
apply to regulation of free exercise as well as free speech, 7 and at least
one subsequent case lends indirect support to this extension. 8
Consequently, one way to decide whether a conditional benefit
burdening free exercise is constitutional is to evaluate the state interest
behind the benefit according to the four O'Brien criteria., The first
63. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). Because the Court cited Sherbert at
this point, id., it is apparent that the new language used in Yoder was not intended to
represent a new substantive standard for free exercise cases. Note, sulra note 23, at 540
n.121.
64. 391 U.S. 567 (1968).
65. Id. at 376-77.
66. Id. at 377.
67. O'Brien cited Sherbert in its references to past compelling interest cases, id. at
376 n.22, 377 n.27, and the O'Brien test itself refers generally to "First Amendment free-
doms." Id. at 377. The facts involved in O'Brien were similar in many wa)s to those at
issue in Sherbert and other free exercise cases. Like the unemployment laws in Sherbert,
the draft laws under which O'Brien was convicted did not appear to implicate First
Amendment freedoms. Nevertheless, they caused "incidental" burdens on expression be-
cause certain individuals chose to express their beliefs by conduct contrary to the statu-
tory directives. Id. at 376. O'Brien did involve a direct prohibition, rather than a condi-
tional benefit, but the exact nature of the burden on First Amendment freedoms should
not alter the anal)sis applied in assessing the countervailing state interests.
68. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977) (O'Brien test applied in case in-
volving restraints on religiously motivated expression).
69. This approach is inapplicable to cases where a neutral state law affects ancillary
activities of a religious group that are not themselves practices required by religion. A
compelling state interest is not required in such instances. See King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC,
498 F.2d 51, 59-61 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974) (FCC antibias regulations
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criterion, requiring that the law be within the constitutional power of
government, actually poses a separate issue. First Amendment inquiry
would be unnecessary if the law were invalid for this more general
reason.70 Although some commentators have considered the second
criterion, that the law further an important or substantial state in-
terest, to be insignificant, 71 it does place certain restrictions on a
state's actions. If the interest justifying a burden on free exercise must
be "substantial," one kind of state interest is excluded-administrative
efficiency.72 In addition, the substantial interest must be "further[ed]":
the law must be likely to contribute directly to the state's announced
goal.
73
The third criterion in O'Brien, requiring that the governmental
interest be unrelated to the suppression of expression, is intended to
invalidate laws that burden First Amendment freedoms intentionally
rather than merely incidentally. This criterion implies that religious
conduct may not be restricted either because it is not favored by the
government or because the beliefs it reflects are thought to be dan-
gerous.7 4 This analytic step may play a key role in some cases, 75 but
carries no force when the law at issue is assumed to be a secular regula-
tion that creates only unintended burdens on free exercise.76
The first three O'Brien standards provide little free exercise protec-
tion from secular regulations because they would validate most laws
regardless of the severity of the burdens they imposed. The key criterion
is the fourth one, which requires that incidental burdens on First
do not inhibit religious exercise or expression when applied to hiring by religious
radio station of employees for jobs unconnected with espousal of religious doctrine;
Yoder is "inapposite"); Meyers v. Southwest Region Conf. Ass'n of Seventh Day
Adventists, 230 La. 310, 323, 88 So. 2d 381, 386 (1956) (workmen's compensation laws
apply to churches as employers); Allendale Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Gros-
man, 30 N.J. 273, 277-80, 152 A.2d 569, 571-72 (1959), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 536
(1960) (zoning regulation requiring church to provide off-street parking is reasonable and
therefore constitutional).
70. Cf. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balanc-
ing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1483 n.10 (1975) (constitutional
power test is "superfluous").
71. E.g., id. at 1485-86 (important state interest test has "trivial functional significance").
72. See Note, The Religious Rights of the Incarcerated, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 812, 865-66
(1977) (citing cases) ("economy" and "convenience" generally denied compelling interest
statts by Supreme Court).
73. Cf. Ely, supra note 70, at 1486 n.17 (littering regulations could ultimately be linked
to quality of life and even to survival of planet); Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLuNI. L.
REV. 1091, 1102 (1968) (O'Brien Court failed to recognize "remote and speculative" nature
of state interests asserted and fact that statute was ill-designed to achieve desired results).
74. A law that burdened a religion because it was disfavored or thought dangerous
would be absolutely barred by the establishment clause. See pp. 1482-83 infra.
75. See Ely, supra note 70, at 1496-97 (third criterion is "definitive" part of overall
test because it distinguishes suspect regulations from less questionable ones).
76. See p. 1468 supra.
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Amendment freedoms be no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of the state interest involved. This criterion infuses into First Amend-
ment law what is generally known as a "less restrictive alternative" 77
or "less drastic means"78 test. Unfortunately, the method for applying
this test has been left ambiguous by the Court 7 9
In order to decide whether the state can achieve its goals in a
manner that imposes lesser burdens on religious freedom, the relevant
state goals at stake must be analyzed in detail. The less drastic means
requirement implicitly assumes that some statutory purposes are in-
sufficient to justify a law burdening constitutional rights.80 The third
criterion, which invalidates intentional burdens on rights, suggests
that one such insufficient purpose is the imposition of a burden for
its own sake. In addition, the substantiality requirement in criterion
two plays a role here:"' if the state's only argument is that an alterna-
tive regulation will be administratively less efficient, then it must
accept that alternative.82 To justify a burden on free exercise, the
state must prove that any less restrictive law would fail to achieve a
substantial state goal.83
2. Mitigation and Compelling State Interests
Applying the O'Brien criteria to the objective mitigation rule re-
quires identification of the state interests served by the mitigation
doctrine. Traditional tort theory justifies mitigation requirements in
77. Ely, supra note 70, at 1484.
78. Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 473-74
(1969).
79. Ely, supra note 70, at 1484-87 (test may be interpreted in two ways); Note, supra
note 78, at 468 (exact manner in which Court applies test remains uncertain).
80. Otherwise, it would always be possible for the state to argue that a law's purpose
is to achieve all of its actual effects. Cf. Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal
Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 128-32 (1972) (statute's purpose can always be defined as
burdening or benefiting of identified class, thereby making statute rational in equal
protection terms). If such an argument were accepted, only another law with wholly
identical effects would constitute a valid less restrictive alternative. Thus there must be
some limit on the set of state goals that can justify burdens on First Amendment free-
doms. Cf. id. at 138-39 (when courts label statute irrational, they often mean that some
of goals it pursues are "impermissible").
81. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 599-600 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (im-
portant interest test merges with less drastic means test).
82. See p. 1477 supra; Note, supra note 23, at 542 (state must accept less efficient
alternate means as long as state interest still served sufficiently). Arguably, the Court
ruled out administrative efficiency as a justification for a burden on free exercise in
Sherbert when it rejected the state's argument that an exemption for Sabbatarians would
lead to an increase in fraudulent claims. 374 U.S. at 407. See Marcus, supra note 62, at
1242.
83. See Clark, supra note 42, at 345 (should be rebuttable presumption that state can
achieve its end in alternative ways); Note, supra note 72, at 869.
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"fairness" terms as a mechanism for protecting defendants from lia-
bility for additional injuries that, because of a plaintiff's intervening
conduct, they did not proximately cause.8 4 More modern theory justi-
fies the requirements as a mechanism for the minimization of accident
costs.8 Under this view, the mitigation rule places an incentive on the
plaintiff to reduce the impact of an accident through medical care,
thus preventing needless imposition of expenses on the defendant.
Under either the fairness or the cost avoidance approach to mitiga-
tion, the objective rule satisfies the first three O'Brien criteria. The
state certainly has the constitutional power to create rules of liability.86
In doing so, the state has a substantial interest, unrelated to the sup-
pression of religious exercise, in choosing a mitigation rule that pro-
motes fairness or minimizes the social costs of accidents.8 7
The fourth O'Brien test, the less restrictive alternative requirement,
requires a closer examination of the asserted state interests; the partic-
ular rule that creates a burden on free exercise must be "essential to
the furtherance"88 of those interests.89 The issue is whether the state
would be unable to achieve its admittedly substantial goals if it adopted
a less restrictive rule that allowed some consideration of the religious
beliefs of plaintiffs.90
Such a modification of the mitigation rule' would not significantly
diminish the fairness of the state's tort system. Indeed, special treat-
ment for religious plaintiffs may be fully consistent with the fairness
principles that underlie the mitigation doctrine, even though the
84. Morro v. Brockett, 109 Conn. 87, 92, 145 A. 659, 661 (1929) (plaintiff's failure to
use reasonable care might "inject an intervening cause which would pro tanto render the
defendant's act a remote cause"); see Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 117, 132 (1871) (mitiga-
tion rule is one of good faith and fair dealing); Colvin v. John Powell 8: Co., 163 Neb.
112, 133, 77 N.W.2d 900, 914 (1956) (damages will be adjusted where, because of failure to
mitigate, it is not just to compel defendant to pay full compensation); Walter Nashert &
Sons v. McCann, 460 P.2d 941, 943 (Okla. 1969) (religious claimant will not be permitted
to impose unreasonable additional burdens on his employer in practicing his beliefs).
85. C. fCCORIMicK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 33, at 127 (1935) (mitigation
rule is mechanism to protect and conserve economic welfare of entire community). Cf. G.
CALABRESr, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970) (along with preserving justice, main purpose
of accident law is to minimize overall accident costs).
86. The development of common law liability rules has been a major function of the
state for many centuries. V. PROSSER, supra note 2, at § 7. These rules now represent an
important tool used by government as it responds to the serious "accident problem" in
our society. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, at §§ 11.1, 11.5.
87. Cf. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954) (state has
"natural interest" in providing injured citizens with means to recover damages).
88. 391 U.S. at 377.
89. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) ("we must searchingly examine"
state's asserted interests, rather than accepting "sweeping claims").
90. For the present, no distinction is being made between a case-by-case approach to
the problem and a full exemption for plaintiffs with beliefs that forbid medical care.
For a discussion of the issues raised by that further choice, see pp. 1482-87 infra.
1479
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 87: 1466, 1978
result may be increased liability for defendants. In numerous in-
stances, tort law recognizes that a plaintiff's preexisting physical and
mental characteristics should not operate to deny him full compensa-
tion.91 Like these other characteristics, religious beliefs can be seen as
preexisting features of a plaintiff's makeup that it may be impossible,
or at least unfair, to change through financial incentives. 92 It is argu-
able that a modification of the mitigation rule to relieve the pressure
on religious plaintiffs would actually increase rather than diminish the
fairness of the tort system.98
A modification of the objective rule to accommodate religion might
also improve the cost-minimizing qualities of the system. The duty
to mitigate operates to reduce the social impact of accidents by
motivating plaintiffs to reduce their injuries. Plaintiffs' mitigation
efforts may be judged by means of Judge Learned Hand's definition of
reasonable conduct: 94 they must seek any treatment the cost of which
is less than the benefit to be produced, discounted by the likelihood of
that benefit.95 By penalizing plaintiffs who fail to obtain adequate
91. See, e.g., Snider v. Callahan, 250 F. Supp. 1022, 1023 (W.D. Mo. 1966) (court must
weigh subjective abilities of plaintiff in judging contributory negligence by mentally
deficient person); Owen v. Dix, 210 Ark. 562, 566, 196 S.W.2d 913, 915 (1946) (plaintiff
whose weak spine aggravated injuries will be given full recovery because of "well-settled"
rule of full compensation where victim is predisposed to injury). Cf. James & Dickinson,
Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARV. L. REv. 769, 786-87 (1950) (fault standard
should be more subjective for contributory negligence than for actionable negligence).
But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 464 (1965) (consistent standard of reasonable
care applies to all plaintiffs except children and perhaps fully insane).
92. See Clark, supra note 42, at 337 (disobedience of law that conflicts with one's
religion is often "inevitable" and in some sense "involuntary"). Religious beliefs can
occupy a central position in an individual's personality and may outweigh the influence
of external motivating factors. See M. ARGYLE & B. BEIT-HALLAHM, THE SOCIAL PYSCHOLocv
OF RELIGION 199-201 (1975) (comparing strength of religious beliefs with obsessions of
neurotics); W. CLARK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION 274-75 (1958) (intensely religious
people may have altered views of reality itself that cause them to resist social norms).
The point here is not to denigrate religious faith in any way, but to show why it arguably
should be treated as a fixed characteristic of the plaintiff, rather than as an "attitude"
over which he has control.
93. The "fairness" justification for an objective mitigation rule depends at least in
part on the notion that unusually rash or foolish people can and should modify their
behavior to conform to societal standards. See W. PRossaR, supra note 2, § 32, at 153 (fool
"must learn to conform to [community] standards" or pay for harm he causes). Indeed,
any moral argument about the "fair dealing" that plaintiffs owe to defendants, see note
84 supra, would appear to assume that the mitigation duty extends only to acts over
which the plaintiffs have control. If a religious plaintiff has no real chance to choose be-
tween various curative methods because of the restraints imposed by his beliefs, then he
cannot be morally condemned.
94. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.)
(cost/benefit definition of negligence).
95. Rathborne, Hair & Ridgway Co. v. Williams, 59 F. Supp. 1, 4 (E.D.S.C. 1945)
(mitigation efforts required depend on "extent of the threatened injury as compared
with the expense of remedying the situation, and the practical certainty of success in
preventive effort"); Mobile & O.R.R. v. Red Feather Coal Co., 218 Ala. 582, 585, 119 So.
606, 609 (1929).
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care after an accident, the state seeks to assure that the accident costs
faced by defendants are not unduly exaggerated.90
Under the cost avoidance theory, the task of a judge or jury is to
determine whether the plaintiff accepted all forms of medical treat-
ment that were justified in cost-benefit terms. The objective rule dis-
torts this determination by excluding from a court's consideration a
significant cost of medical care faced by some religious plaintiffs-the
cost of violating one's religious beliefs. One aspect of this potentially
great, but not easily quantified, cost is the psychological injury suffered
by an individual who believes he has violated a divine command. This
injury is as real and legitimate as the "pain and suffering" damages
that are regularly reflected in tort recoveries.9" In addition, society as
a whole, which values an individual's freedom to follow his religious
faith, may suffer a loss when a person violates his beliefs. 98 By ignoring
this cost, the objective rule leads, in at least some cases, to the imposi-
tion of burdens on plaintiffs that are greater than is required by the
goal of accident cost reduction.99
96. For example, if a plaintiff could cure a $100 injury for $50 but does not do so
because there is no mitigation rule, defendants will spend up to $100 preventing that
injury. In such a situation, efficiency is not served because an accident is avoided by the
expensive methods available to defendants, rather than cured by the relatively cheap
methods available to the plaintiff. Cf. R. PosNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 123-24,
142-43 (2d ed. 1977) (contributory negligence rule is necessary to produce most efficient
cost avoidance; punitive damages, by exaggerating defendants' costs, produce inefficiently
high level of investment in prevention).
It might be argued that the incentive created by the mitigation doctrine is unnecessary
because people already have enough incentives to obtain medical care. Cf. Schwartz,
Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697, 710 (1978)
(contributory negligence rule may be unnecessary because plaintiff has "first-party" in-
centives to avoid injuries). But even if this is true, the rule will simply have little effect;
plaintiffs will get the appropriate amount of care and defendants will pay for it.
97. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, at § 25.10.
98. The existence of the First Amendment itself may be taken as evidence of this
social commitment. Even this social cost might be understood in purely utilitarian terms:
society may lose something valuable if it restrains the individuality that may generalize
into socially productive creativity. See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 67-68 (C. Shields ed. 1956).
99. It is possible, but unlikely, that a modification of the objective rule to allow
consideration of religious beliefs would significantly increase overall accident costs by
eliminating the "spreading" benefits of the rule or creating new administrative problems.
See G. CALABRESI, supra note 85, at 27-28. Because it denies full compensation to plaintiffs
who fail to mitigate, the objective rule does spread the burden of some accidents between
plaintiffs and defendants. But such a spreading benefit is inconsequential because it
does not impose burdens on anyone except the immediate parties to an accident. Benefits
from spreading are significant only when the costs are distributed over a large class, as
in insurance schemes or when a manufacturer is held liable for all the defects in his
products. Cf. id. at 279-81 (comparative negligence rule divides burden but does not
spread it because it fails to burden party who can spread loss to others).
The introduction of religious issues into some tort cases is also unlikely to increase
dramatically the costs of adjudication. These issues can be tried like any others by the
courts. In addition, even if administrative costs did increase, they alone cannot justify a
state's failure to discharge its constitutional duty to adopt the less drastic alternative. See
p. 1478 supra.
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A modification of the objective rule that allows consideration of
religious beliefs would likely further the state's fairness and cost
avoidance goals, or at worst still would allow their substantial achieve-
ment. Thus as a "less restrictive alternative," such a modification is
required. 00
II. Case-by-Case Assessments and the Establishment Clause
The case-by-case approach' 01 might function as a less restrictive al-
ternative as required by the fourth O'Brien criterion. It allows courts
to give some weight to religious factors. Nevertheless, establishment
clause principles make this alternative a highly dubious one, thus in-
dicating the need for a third solution-a partial exemption for plaintiffs
with religious beliefs concerning medical care.
A. General Principles
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the exact dimensions of the
establishment concept are difficult to summarize.' 02 It has long been
clear, however, that the fundamental mandate of the establishment
clause is state neutrality in matters affecting religion. 0 3 This require-
ment has been elaborated into a detailed set of rules applicable to
instances of state financial aid to religious organizations.0 4 Although
these rules provide some guidance for assessment of the case-by-case
mitigation rule, 0 5 they must be read in light of the general First
100. The conclusion that the state lacks a compelling interest in the maintenance of
the objective rule is supported by a number of cases holding that government may not
compel acts forbidden by religious beliefs in order to protect the actor from himself. See
People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 719-23, 394 P.2d 813, 816-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 71-74
(1964) (upholding right of pe)otist cult to use drug sacramentally); Montgomery v. Board
of Retirement, 33 Cal. App. 3d 447, 452, 109 Cal. Rptr. 181, 185 (Ct. App. 1973) (where
religious beliefs involved, state interest in preserving health of sane adult "pales into
insignificance"); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 372-73, 205 N.E.2d 435, 441-42 (1965)
(upholding right of adult to refuse life-saving treatments). But see John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 580, 279 A.2d 670, 672 (1971) (denying constitu-
tional right to die).
101. See pp. 1467-68 supra.
102. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
103. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (requirement of neutrality among
religions and between religion and nonreligion); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (establishment clause requires that "the Government maintain
strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion").
104. E.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (statute must have "secular
legislative purpose" and "primary effect ... that neither advances nor inhibits religion"
and must avoid any " 'excessive government entanglement with religion'" (quoting Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
105. See New York v. Cathedral Academy, 98 S. Ct. 340, 345-46 (1977) ("entanglements"
prohibited by Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), include judicial inquiry into
implications of course material at religious school; court cannot be "arbiter of the
essentially religious dispute").
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Amendment principle that the state may not judge the validity of
particular religious doctrines. 10 6 This principle has expanded to pro-
hibit any state pronouncements approving or disapproving particular
religions,'0 7 on the rationale that such pronouncements will indirectly
interfere with freedom of religious choice.' 08
B. Establishment and the Mitigation Rule
The case-by-case solution creates establishment clause issues because
of the danger that it will lead courts to assess religious beliefs.
Analysis of these issues will require renewed attention to the distinc-
tion between the fairness and cost avoidance theories of mitigation.
Traditionally, tort law has promoted fairness by requiring a jury
to assess the reasonableness of the plaintiff's mitigation efforts. A find-
ing of unreasonableness means either that the plaintiff acted without
due regard to the severity of his injuries and the need for medical care,
or that he acted in defiance of his duty to mitigate, knowing that
damages would result. If plaintiffs consciously forgo medical care on
religious grounds, their conduct cannot be treated as thoughtless or
careless; 10 9 instead, the verdict of failure to mitigate must be taken as
a statement that the plaintiff's choice was a willful abrogation of legal
responsibility. But since the duty to mitigate commands only "rea-
106. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (truth of religious claims cannot
be assessed in fraud prosecution); see United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-85 (1965)
(validity of beliefs held by person seeking conscientious objector status cannot be ques-
tioned); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1953) (courts may not "approve, dis-
approve, classify, regulate, or in any manner control sermons delivered at religious meet-
ings"); Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1156-57 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969) (government officials cannot question curative
claims about healing machine that are affirmed as religious doctrine).
Although the courts have seldom been specific about this, the prohibition of judicial
assessment of religious beliefs seems to be essentially an establishment clause rule. The
courts are absolutely barred from such assessment, even where direct coercion of religious
belief has not been shown.
107. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (official school prayer held
invalid as "governmental endorsement" of religion); Lowe v. City of Eugene, 254 Or. 534,
544, 463 P.2d 360, 363 (1969), appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 591, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042
(1970) (denying rehearing) (cross on public land impermissible because it implies state
endorsement of religion). But see Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 276 Or.
1007, 558 P.2d 338 (1976), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3219 (1977) (same cross permissible
when called war memorial under city charter amendment). See also Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d
1256 (1971) (citing cases).
108. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962) (Framers knew that placing government
"stamp of approval" on some religious practices would threaten religious freedom of
dissenters); see Schwartz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77
YALE L.J. 692, 720 (1968) (government preference of particular faiths is feared because it
will lead to imposition of religion).
109. Indeed, in cases involving faith healers like the Christian Scientists, the plaintiffs
believe they are seeking the most effective cure for their injuries. See note 3 supra.
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sonable" steps, such a finding implies that the choice not to seek care
lacked a rational foundation.
A jury verdict thus penalizing religiously motivated conduct may
reflect a conclusion either that such conduct deviates from community
norms," 0 or that the underlying religious beliefs are simply false."'
Under either view, the First Amendment is infringed. The latter in-
terpretation directly contravenes the prohibition against judicial as-
sessment of religious doctrine. The former interpretation, by reacting
to the statistical prevalence in the population of particular beliefs,
results in systematic discrimination against minority groups on the
invidious basis of their unpopularity. Such discrimination cannot be
reconciled with the requirement of state neutrality in religious
matters..
1 1 2
A cost-minimization interpretation might be used to avoid charges
of discrimination or judicial assessment of belief. If determining
"reasonableness" entails no more than weighing costs and benefits, then
arguably inclusion of the psychological cost of violating religious
precepts as a factor in the balance does not require a judge or jury to
pass on the merit of a plaintiff's convictions.1 3 To avoid discrimina-
tion, however, it would be necessary to treat all religious beliefs alike
for this purpose by assigning a fixed cost to the act of violating one's
beliefs." 4 Arguably, this interpretation of the case-by-case rule might
be justified as a secular regulation that only incidentally benefits some
faiths while hindering others.15
It is doubtful, however, that a court can segregate the issue of the
truth or falsity of a plaintiff's beliefs about medical care from the issue
of the efficiency of his mitigation decisions. In judging the costs and
benefits of the treatment decisions made by a plaintiff, the judge or
jury must compare his actual choices with those he could have made.
Even if, in doing so, the court assigns a fixed value to the cost of
110. This interpretation of the verdict would be appropriate if it is assumed that a
jury decided what a reasonable man would do by asking what most people in society
would do in a given situation.
111. The jury verdict may reflect a decision about the truth of the plaintiff's beliefs
because it is arguable that his post-accident conduct is necessarily reasonable if his be-
liefs are true.
112. See notes 103 supra & 116 infra.
113. See p. 1481 supra (costs associated with abandoning one's beliefs). This might
be a plausible explanation of jury instructions, like those in Lange, which state in effect
that religion cannot excuse unreasonable actions but that it should receive some con-
sideration. See p. 1468 supra.
114. An arbitrary value could be assigned to the act of violating any religious beliefs
and applied in all cases involving such an act.
115. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws valid for
secular purposes despite imposition of differential burdens on some religious groups).
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abandoning strongly held beliefs, it must also determine whether an
alternative course of action, involving religiously prohibited treat-
ments, would have cured the plaintiff's injuries more effectively. Thus,
at least where faith healing beliefs are involved, the court must still
assess the truth of the doctrine that such healing is more effective than
medicine.
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the cost factor, which will
necessarily be given an arbitrary value and which cannot be expressed
quantitatively, could be applied consistently. There would be no
mechanism for assuring the application of the same valuation in all
cases. Because jury verdicts tend to depend on factors like jurors'
identification with parties to litigation, there would be a danger of
discrimination against plaintiffs whose particular beliefs were less well-
known or popular.",'
In addition, the cost avoidance interpretation is unlikely to portray
accurately judicial decisionmaking in this area. The traditional fault
language still employed in decisions and jury instructions invites a
court to judge whether a plaintiff's actions seem reasonable in the
ordinary sense. Finally, the cost avoidance interpretation may lead to
verdicts that impose a burden on free exercise similar to that created
by the objective rule."17 If courts consistently undervalue the im-
116. See H. KALVEN 8- H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 193-94, 217-18 (1966) ("empathy"
of jurors with particular defendants is significant factor in verdicts). Christian Scientists,
for example, might be favored over other more obscure groups with similar beliefs. Cf.
Lange v. Hoyt, 114 Conn. 590, 597, 159 A. 575, 578 (1932) (court cannot disregard curative
beliefs held by "large number" of people). It is certainly clear that Christian Scientists
have been given treatment not available to other groups through the creation of legisla-
tive exemptions specifically for them. See, e.g., note 5 supra (statutory exemptions for
Christian Scientists from duty to accept medical care under workmen's compensation);
John, supra note 5, at 19 (citing statutes). Yet the invidious nature of such discrimination
is apparent. See Kolbeck v. Kramer, 84 N.J. Super. 569, 576, 202 A.2d 889, 893 (Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1964) (invalidating state university regulation exempting from vaccination
program Christian Science students but not others with similar beliefs).
A further indication of the inherent danger of discrimination in cases where mitigation
by religious plaintiffs is an issue can be seen in cases where plaintiffs, seeking child
support payments, have sued doctors or pharmacists for causing pregnancies by their
negligence. E.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. 1974), affd, 349
A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) (where plaintiff victim of negligent sterilization operation, court did
not require alternatives less costly than raising child); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App.
240, 258 n.ll, 260, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519 n.11, 520 (Ct. App. 1971) (where tranquilizers
dispensed instead of birth control pills plaintiff not required to have abortion or place
child for adoption; effect of religious scruples acknowledged as factor in decision). Al-
though a strong argument can be made in these situations for an abortion as an inex-
pensive, safe, and relatively easy way to mitigate damages, no court has yet been persuaded
to require this form of mitigation.
117. See pp. 1472-75 supra. Because the establishment clause and the free exercise
clause work in the same direction in this situation, this establishment argument is not
open to criticism as an overly "wooden" or inflexible example of constitutional analysis.
Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring in result) (to deny
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portance of religious convictions, individuals will continue to feel
pressured by the mitigation rule toward abandonment of their beliefs.
III. Exemption as a Solution
Because the objective rule burdens free exercise unjustifiably and
the case-by-case alternative to that rule runs afoul of the establishment
clause, the only interpretation of the mitigation doctrine that accom-
modates all First Amendment concerns entails a limited exemption
from mitigation duties for plaintiffs who have religious beliefs con-
cerning medical care. They should be required to pursue only those
"reasonable" curative methods that do not violate their religious con-
victions. These convictions would operate as constraints that restrict
the alternatives available to the "reasonable man" in the plaintiff's
position.
In implementing this proposed exemption, the courts should accept
a plaintiff's religious beliefs as stated by him, although his sincerity
would still be open to question."" Rather than allow a jury to hear
evidence about religious beliefs and to draw their own conclusions, it
would be preferable to minimize the danger of hidden discrimination
by giving to the judge the task of hearing this evidence and presenting
his conclusions to the jury as established facts." 19
This proposed exemption would impose additional financial burdens
on defendants to protect the religious freedom of plaintiffs. In this
respect, it differs from most religious exemptions, which impose
burdens on the state.'12 0 There is, however, authority for the proposi-
tion that such a particularized burden may be legislatively imposed.'1
2 '
religious exemption on basis of establishment clause would be to apply clause in wooden
manner). This is not a case where the establishment clause is being used to thwart an
effort by the state to accommodate religious exercise.
118. The Court has recognized that assessments of the sincerity of religious claims are
sometimes necessary and permissible. E.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185
(1965); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 84-86 (1944).
119. See p. 1485 supra. It could be argued that juries may make decisions in cases
involving religion that the state could not make openly. Cf. Clark, supra note 42, at 352
(when juries judge sincerity of beliefs, they can aid state by looking at reasonablens of
beliefs and weighing countervailing state interests); White, Processing Conscientious Ob-
jector Claims: A Constitutional Inquiry, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 672 (1968) (jury is best
institution to make conclusory judgment in sensitive area of sincerity of conscientious
objector claims). Because juries are likely to be less careful about constitutional rights,
however, their role should be minimized. Cf. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process,"
83 HARv. L. REv. 518, 526-30 (1970) (argument that "any expansive conception of the
jury's role is inconsistent with a vigorous application of the first amendment").
120. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (additional unemployment compensa-
tion that is paid because of exemption comes from state fisc).
121. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 433 U.S. 903 (1976) (upholding civil rights statutory requirement of ac-
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For example, the courts have upheld federal civil rights laws that
require employers to make reasonable efforts to accommodate the
religious beliefs of their employees.' 22 There is no reason to believe
that the judiciary, in its role as interpreter of common law liability
rules, lacks the same power to allocate the costs of protecting con-
stitutional rights.
An exemption for plaintiffs with beliefs about medical care would
not significantly impair the state's pursuit of its goals through tort law;
it might even advance those goals. 123 This simple device would
eliminate a substantial burden on religious freedom while avoiding
the many constitutional complications involved in any less absolute
solution.
commodation even where Sabbatarian employee's special exemption caused complaints
and required other employees to work extra time on weekends); see Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (accommodation rule upheld, although employer
made adequate efforts in this case); cf. Note, supra note 23, at 552-53 (establishment clause
does not prohibit accommodations that affect particular other citizens).
The conscientious objector provisions in the selective service statutes have continually
been upheld against claims that they violate the establishment clause, e.g., Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), even though it could be argued that this accommoda-
tion of religion also imposes a severe burden on other citizens-those additional men who
must be drafted to serve because religious men have been exempted.
122. See note 121 supra.
123. See pp. 1479-82 supra.
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